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Abstract
The paper addresses the issue of rethinking the welfare state as a part of a broader national
system of social protection (NSSP) and a mode of societal regulation. In order to overcome
the theoretical limits of bottom-up comparative analysis of welfare states, one builds a
structural model of such a NSSP, inspired by french “régulation” theory. In this model, the
nucleus of every NSSP is composed of three speciﬁc relationships bounding the economic
and the political orders to the domestic sphere via the mediation of speciﬁc institutions: ﬁrst
a relationship of economic consubstantiality (social insurance for example), second a
relationship of political alliance with the State (the welfare-state), third a relation of
protection of the domestic order (the mix of social insurance beneﬁts and public assistance
allocations that insures the reproduction of life chances of the individual in the family
framework). But a fourth relation must be introduced in the model in order to loop it
dynamically, namely the wage-labor relation, or more widely, the set of market coverages of
domestic life (wage, fringe beneﬁts, private insurances, savings). The model is used to
obtain a logical typology and a set of ideal-types of NSSP that add to the usual threefold
clustering of Welfare States a fourth type exempliﬁed by Japan. Then, building the same
type of structural model for the national system of political representation (NSPR), and
examining the institutional complementarities between NSSP and NSPR, one deﬁnes
different national modes of societal regulation among which the Japanese conﬁguration of
its social and political institutions appears as one of the ideal-types. Finally, focusing on the
French case, one examines, through the concepts of societal coherence and hybridization,
how institutional change can be grasped in the framework of this theoretical approach of
societal regulation. 
Keywords: welfare state, social regulation, international comparisons, institutional
complementality, structural analysis.
Introduction
International comparisons of national systems of social protection (from now on NSSP)
Evol. Inst. Econ. Rev. 7(2): 177–208 (2011)
JEL: H1, O57, P51, B52, Z10.have grown in line with a cumulative process of knowledge widening (Ferrera, 1994).
Nevertheless as Therborn (1987) already noticed 24 years ago, this process still has not
produced truely theoretical outcomes. Since 1990, despite many criticisms, the ideal-
types built by Esping-Andersen (1990) and the associated clustering in three worlds—
liberal, conservative and social-democratic—of welfare capitalism has become a new
orthodoxy, in line with the growing inﬂuence in the social sciences of the liberal
common sense and the renewal of the idea of convergence of social systems. Therefore
the progress of knowledge in the ﬁeld has been more empirically extensive than
theoretically intensive, with more countries, from the periphery as well from the core of
capitalism, being included in the comparative framework.
1) The etatist bias of the
comparisons linked to their restriction to welfare states, despite the varying degrees of
welfare stateness of the NSSPs (Flora, 1986), is an important cause of this matter of fact.
Furthermore, the focus of the comparisons on public spendings and quantitative
indicators and the weak attention paid to institutional forms has led them to important
mismatches.
One good example of this mismatches is Japan which, according to the weakness of its
welfare public spending, is still often classiﬁed, following Esping-Andersen (1990), in
the liberal welfare states family with the United States. Yet Esping-Andersen (1997) has
recognised that Japan was not a liberal welfare state and did not ﬁt in his divide of the
world in three regimes of welfare capitalism. He argued it is an hybrid, combining
characteristics of the liberal and conservative regimes. But so doing he has introduced a
logical contradiction in his theoretical framework between his central primary idea of
building clusters (separate “worlds”) of countries—assuming that all the countries
pertain to one or another cluster—and the idea of hybridization—implying to the
contrary that some countries do not ﬁnd any place in the clusters. A solution to this
contradiction would be to consider Japan as a true exception—a unique case (Lipset,
1994)—which would conﬁrm the rule (three worlds are enough because no other
country can follow the Japanese road to welfare). Nonetheless this solution has been
challenged by Esping-Andersen himself. More recently, in a discussion about varieties of
capitalism and the labelling of non liberal market economies, Pontusson (2005) proposes
another labelling of Esping-Andersen’s typology, introducing a concept of “social market
economies” (including two subtypes: “scandinavian” and “continental” countries) that
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1) For a very stimulant survey of the recent literature from a South American point of view, see Draibe
and Riesco, 2006.does not include Japan, despite the same author considers that Japan is a non liberal
market economy. Japan, as well as France (and Italy), is then kept out of any cluster and
therefore of any theorisation.
Thus, as suggested by Ragin (1994) whose “boolean analyses cast serious doubt on
the idea of (only) three types of welfare capitalism”,
2) why not consider that Japan is an
another ideal-type of welfare capitalism (Therborn, 1987), a fourth world of NSSPs that
would include others East Asian countries? But this idea raises another question: can
paternalistic (patronage) forms of social protection and welfare state, even when
systematically moulded, be considered as a capitalist ideal-type, and not only transitional
features of periods of low development of the wage-labor nexus? There are no easy
answers to these questions and clearly they call for further empirical and theoretical
investigation.
France also does not ﬁt well in the “conservative-corporatist” Bismarckian cluster
where it is usually classiﬁed as a member. But France cannot be considered like Japan as
a foreigner in the worlds of European welfare states and their North American
extensions. It pertains to these worlds and has to be considered as a true hybrid of the
Bismarckian and Beveridgean traditions (Bonoli and Palier, 1995; Barbier and Théret,
2003, 2009), which deﬁnitely calls into question the idea of clustering.
Thus Japan and France, because they do not ﬁt easily in largely accepted typologies,
illustrate the theoretical problems set up by present comparative analysis when it is
supported by a strictly bottom-up, european state-centered, and clustering methodology.
Since “cluster analysis yield clear archetypal cores but fuzzy peripheries” (Hicks, 1991),
welfare states’ clusters are instable and depending on the criteria of classiﬁcation favoured.
It is not surprising given the diversity of institutional forms and the multiplicity of social
security and welfare ﬁelds which necessarily weaken any general typology built only upon
empirical evidence. Clustering implies a restriction of the levels and criteria of
comparisons, and consequently appeals for a general theory to justify such a limitation and
the choice of the criteria retained. So a typology must be rooted at a level of abstraction
higher than that of stylised facts and institutions, and bottom-up approach to types’
modelisation has to be linked to a top-down speciﬁcation of general theoretical concepts.
The régulation approach has made a lot of comparative analyses of national economic
systems and has introduced in economics, explicitly or implicitly, methodological rules
that are close to those discussed in comparative political science, sociology and history.
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2) For Ragin (1994), “it is clear (...) that the diversity of pensions systems (and, by implication,
welfare states) is greater than that allowed in Esping-Andersen’s tripartite scheme.”The three most important of these rules are: 1/not to compare insulated elements but only
social relations between elements and autonomous systems of these relations (see the
basic relations—wage labor nexus, competition and money—and the notion of
“relation of relations” used to take hold of the State and the international system); 2/not
to compare these relations at the surface of their institutional phenomenal forms but at a
more abstract level where the common structures of these forms can be elucidated (see
the concept of accumulation regime); 3/not to compare these structures and their
reproduction regimes only along their historical development but also as parts of a whole
synchronic setting (see the notions of institutional complementarity and conﬁguration of
the mode of regulation).
These rules followed by the régulation school are an inheritance of marxist
conceptualisations and structuralist methology. But, in the social protection ﬁeld,
régulation theory could not refer to such a strong legagy. Therefore, in its ﬁrst
developments, it has not given special keys to catch hold of similarities and differences
between the various NSSP, as well as to seize the impact of these variations on the
conﬁguration of different modes of regulation. That is why, like comparative analysis in
political science and sociology, régulation approach carries on using mainly an empirical
bottom-up and case oriented way to specify the diversity of capitalisms.
The aim of this article is to overcome these limits and to show that more general
theoretical outcomes can be produced if régulation theory is widened to include the
political and if it explicits the analytical consequences of its implicit relation to
constructivist morphogenetic and methodic structuralism. To put it more precisely, in
order to analyse the variety of NSSPs and its impact on the diversiﬁcation of the socio-
economic modes of regulation, the regulationist theoretical framework of analysis needs
to include the political, and build a theory of social protection capable to ground a
general typology of NSSPs. As I have already published some views on the ﬁrst issue
(Théret, 1992, 1994, 1997, 1998a, 1999, 2000b, 2002a, 2003, 2006), I propose here
several insights on the second. In a ﬁrst section, I specify the two concepts of social
protection and welfare-state as forms of the social bond in modern differentiated
societies. In a second section, with these concepts I build a model of the elementary
structure of every NSSP, and I use a structural analysis to contextualise this model at a
middle range of abstraction where deductive approach can meet the usual bottom-up
ideal-types; thus I obtain a stable typology of four “harmonic models” and ideal-types of
NSSP where Japan appears as the standard for one of them. In the third section, thanks to
the use of the same methodology to deﬁne types of national systems of political
B. THÉRET
–180–representation (from now on NSPR), I formulate different models of institutional
complementarity between NSSP and NSPR which I put at the core of the diversity of
modes of socio-economic regulation. And in the fourth and last section, building on the
distinction introduced in section 2 between institutional conﬁgurations of the mode of
regulation which are “harmonic” (i.e. stable and ideal-typical due to their institutional
coherence) and “disharmonic”, I examine the implications of such a theoretical
framework for institutional change theory, illustrating the issue by empirical references
to the French disharmonic case.
1. Conceptualising National Systems of Social Protection (NSSPs) as
Structures of Relations: The Concepts of Social Protection and Welfare
State
As stated by Polanyi (1984), social protection in a modern capitalist society is self-
protection against the risks of break up that this type of society has to bear, due to the
disembeddedness of its economic order and the emergence of self-regulated market
devices. The submission to market law of the labor force, which can only be a ﬁcticious
commodity, generates the need for a set of social security institutions in order to
reconstruct the social bond whose previous forms have been dissolved by capitalist
market forces. The autonomization of the economic order from the political, and the
correlative insulation of the domestic order (family) from both have broken off the old
social bond. The NSSPs act as mediation between these three new autonomous spheres
of social practices—the capitalist corporation, the nuclear family and the administrative
State—that participates to the reinstitution of societal cohesion. The social welfare
relationships are only a partial expression of the new social bond which actually is
compound of a whole set of various systems of economic, political and symbolical
mediations (money, law, system of political representation, and of mass-medias of
communication, etc.) (Théret, 1998b). NSSPs articulate the logics of the economic and
the political at the level of economic (market and ﬁscal) practices. They make use of the
monetary medium to insure the material conditions of biological and demographical
reproduction of the human being under the forms of labor force and power force (Théret,
1994, 2006).
In order to work in that way, a NSSP has to be basically structured by three different
macro-economic relations of “economic consubstantiality”, “political alliance” and
“domestic protection”. The market-capitalist economic substance of social welfare under
wage-earning class capitalism (“capitalisme salarial”) compells the state political order
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economic order passing by social security organisations.
1.1 The consubstantiality to the economic order of modern social
protection
Whatever theoretical or historical is the point of view, the best way to bring out the new
features of the modern institutions of social protection is to come back to the inaugural
situation of their emergence from previous forms in the process of differentiation and
growing autonomy of the capitalist economic order. The incapability of the labor market
to self-adjust the wage to the needs of domestic reproduction of wage-earners in the long
run, and the correlative necessity to consider the preliminary presence of non market
norms and forms of distribution of income within the economic sphere itself lead to the
logical conclusion that social institutions under capitalism are primarily of the same
economic substance as the wage relationship (Southall, 1994). Although these
institutions (patronage and capitalist paternalistic philanthropy, trade-unions, mutual
funds, friendly societies, fringe beneﬁts and so on) are not properly market institutions,
they are capital-labor ones, and participate within the proper capitalist organizations to
the dynamics and stabilization of the accumulation regime. Social security and wages
belong to the same monetary structure of wage-earners resources allowing the
management in a pure capitalist logic of the distance between domestic and economic
orders (Friot, 1993). Nevertheless, it is only the ﬁrst part of the story.
1.2 An alliance between economic and political orders through social
security
The second part of the story is relative to the role of present-day social security
organizations in the institution of an alliance between the State and capitalism. As soon
as the economic order cannot be reduced to the market place and involves also non
market institutions and organisations as we just put it, the empirical evidence that social
protection organizations haven’t remained structured by purely direct economic-
domestic relationships cannot be explained by the traditional argument stating a
necessary intervention of the State to make up for the market failures. One needs an
explanation involving the speciﬁc place of social protection in the logic of the state
political order and primarily as a requisite of reproduction of state sovereignty.
Before being institutionalized as a social system of its own in contemporary societies,
the protection of the population was an attribute of sovereign powers, due to a symbolic
structure as universal as the incest prohibition: the “life debt” inherited by every human
being on her/his birthday. That is, coming to life, any human being is endowed with a
B. THÉRET
–182–“life capital” whose symbolic counterpart is an indebtedness vis-` a-vis what exists before
and beyond life, viz the realm where is located the spring of immortality which is
represented either by God, the Father, the Ancestors answerable for Tradition, and more
recently the State and/or the Nation. So the temporal institutions (churches, states)
credited with being the representative on earth of the heavenly bankers of life, thanks to
their durability, are accounted with the sovereign power, a dual power to protect the life
of the indebted as well as to arbitrarily dispose of their life (Théret, 1998a, 1999).
The development of industrial capitalism progressively undoes this traditional tie of
protection immanent to religious-political sovereignty, and the life capital (under its
representation as labour force) becomes more and more able to ﬁnd autonomous
valorization in the economic, under new monetary forms (besides the juridical ones) of
capitalization of entitlements over life as money-capital, savings and insurances. To put it
another way, with the differentiation of society and the emerging competitive powers of
capitalism and the State, the protection of society and population gets rid of its primal
unseparable religious-political-economic nature. Therefore, in order to maintain its
sovereignty and legitimacy, the State has to reconstruct its original administrative
relationship of control of the domestic life in a way that takes into account the new
economic autonomous capacity to produce social protection. Besides the process of
democratisation, the State has performed the task by “marrying” the economically
consubstantial institutions of social security. The welfare-state is the institutional form of
this marriage between the intermediate organizations of social security, grounded in the
economic, and the political. Through it, a broader alliance between the economic and the
political orders is built that allows the distribution of domestic protection according to a
compromise favouring the concomitant reproduction of both splitted orders. The political
may use the economic institutions of social security for its own ends, as soon as it
respects the contract of alliance by which it brings in exchange its physical violence
monopoly and its juridical power of control of the population. Therefore the welfare-
state, as a composite and mixed form, cannot be reduced anymore to a pure form of the
State (Kaufmann, 1985; Flora, 1986).
1.3 The protection of the domestic order by the welfare state
Henceforth a speciﬁc domestic protection relation appears under the form of a mixed
relationship between the households and the welfare-state. This relationship is a uniﬁed
but contradictory one because it links the domestic order to a couple of networking
organizations, the State and the social security system; the dialectical feature of such a
relation stands out clearly from its dual though unseparable content, mixing social
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in the various sectoral components of the domestic protection relationship it is not
possible to insulate the social insurance economic content from the public redistribution-
assistance political one.
2. The Elementary Forms of Social Protection, a Theoretical Model for
Comparative Analysis and the Building of a Typology of NSSPs
Let me now contextualize the concepts of NSSP and welfare-state in order to go forward
in the analysis of the national diversity of modes of regulation. In order to do so, I use in
a speciﬁc way the methodology of structural analysis that Claude Lévi-Strauss applied
for his own sake to the kinship systems in undifferentiated societies. I do it for various
reasons, but the overwhelming one is that the Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of kinship systems
is an example, perhaps the only one of its kind, of comparative analysis articulating both
top-down and bottom-up approaches to the classiﬁcation of social systems. Another
important reason for building upon it is that one can assume a structural homology
between the NSSP in wage-earners societies, and the kinship system in undifferentiated
societies, thanks to their equivalent reproductive and cohesive role in these societies. A
third argument for such a transfer of technology is the common intellectual relationship
of Lévi-Strauss and régulation theory with Marx that explains the shared support of both
for the three methodological rules I recalled above (Théret, 1997, 2003).
Given this background, we ﬁrst elaborate the formula of an “elementary form of social
protection” to stylise the morphogenetic structure which links together the three
foregrounded relations, thanks to the introduction of a fourth relationship closing the
whole structure: the wage labor/capital relationship. Second, from a structural analysis
using the pairs of oppositions linking its four terms, I deduce a series of formal types of
this elementary form of social protection, and among them, I pull out four “harmonic
models” of NSSP. Three of these harmonic models can be considered as the equivalents
of the inductive ideal-types found in the comparative literature on welfare states: the
liberal USA, the conservative Germany, and the social-democratic Sweden. But there is a
value added by the deductive method: Japan appears as an illustration of a fourth
harmonic model of NSSP.
2.1 Capitalist coverage of domestic reproduction and the molecule of
social protection
The value-added by Lévi-Strauss (1947–2002, 1954–1973) to the theory of kinship
systems mainly resides in the overwhelming role he gives to the maternal uncle, a fourth
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three—the father, the mother or father’s wife and the child—. For Lévi-Strauss, as soon
as prevails the incest taboo, the prohibition of consanguineous sexual relations requires
that family reproduction passes through relations of marriage and alliance between non
consanguineous groups. The result is the surge in the structure of kinship of an avuncular
relationship—or avunculate—between the mother’s brother and the son, according to
the role of the former as the male representative of the group giving a woman to the
group of the father and consequently invested of a power of control on the offspring of
the marriage. The avunculate loops the elementary structure (“atom”) of kinship by
articulating the three others relations of consanguinity (brother-sister), marriage
(husband-wife) and ﬁliation (parents-children) in a way that participates to the
genealogical reproduction of the two allied groups (see Fig. 1).
The structural homology I assume between kinship and social protection in the
respective societies where they are worth as elements of “life capital” social reproduction
allows us to consider that the wage labor-capital relationship plays in the NSSP a role
similar or equivalent to the role of the avunculate in the kinship system. Therefore,
rooting the NSSP within the process of genealogical reproduction of the domestic order
enlightens the fact that the direct labor-capital relation and the other private economic
forms (derived from wages) of meeting the needs of domestic reproduction (fringe
beneﬁts, individual insurance and personal savings)—I group the whole set in the
reduced expression of capitalist (or market) coverage relationship of domestic
reproduction—, are a ﬁrst order component of the NSSP that ensures the closure as well
as the dynamic looping of its elementary structure. Thus a NSSP will be correctly
displayed as a system if it involves not three but four different relations linked together
along a circuit of monetary ﬂows of domestic protection and whose interdependencies can
be designed in an elementary structure or “molecule” of social protection (see Fig. 2).
3)
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3) I call it a molecule, and not an atom, because it represents a complex body whose elements linked
together are not single physical persons but macro-entities, i.e. sets of organisations.
Fig. 1. Elementary structure of kinship systems.According to the model, the monetary ﬂows of social protection [from E to (P S) to
D] become collective means of consumption (Théret, 1982) in the domestic order where
they reproduce the “life capital” of individuals and so participate to the formation of their
socially acknowledged values in the economic order (through the labor market and
employment in capitalist organizations). Thus the wage is both the starting and the
arrival point of the capitalist circuit of social protection, and depending on the way it is
ﬁxed, it ensures (or does not, but then there is crisis) the internal and dynamic coherence
of NSSP. Consequently it is not possible to grasp a NSSP in the only synchronical
dimension where market incomes and monetary ﬂows of social protection are in
opposition as alternative forms of domestic economic reproduction. They must also be
seized in their dynamic complementary through which they reciprocally are engendered
one by the other and derive one from the other.
2.2 Harmonic models of NSSP: a typology
In the molecule of social protection, S (social security organizations) and D (families)
are intermediary and mixed elements, integrating simultaneously in their functioning
both economic and political logics. Therefore they cannot be simultaneously close (there
would be social indifferentiation) or distant (there would be no social cohesion possible)
from the economic and the political which are contradictory poles. If they are closer to
one pole (for example the economic), they have to be more distant from the other (to say
the political), and vice versa. The ideal state for their autonomy and mediating efﬁciency
is maintaining an equal distance to both the economic and the political.
More generally the dynamic stability of such a system of social protection implies the
institutional regulation of three binary synchronic oppositions. First, there is a structural
opposition between the economic consubstantiality relation between the economic and
social security organisations (D-S) and the relation of covenant (S P) between the
latters and the political, which is constitutive of the welfare-state. The nature of
institutionnalised compromises between these two relations determines the “degree of
welfare stateness” (Flora, 1986) of the NSSP.
Then, the relation of social protection by the welfare state of the domestic sphere
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Fig. 2. Elementary structure of national systems of social protection.[(S P)—D], and the market (capitalist) coverage relation of domestic reproduction are
also in a synchronical opposition. The institutionnalised compromise between the two
relations which ﬁxes their respective shares in the “life capital” economic reproduction
determines the “degree of decommodiﬁcation” (Esping-Andersen, 1990) of the labor
force and domestic life.
In the formula of the molecule, these oppositions for each pair of relationships can be
symbolised by the signs ( ) and ( ), a sign ( ) for a relation indicating a closeness
between its elements or a high intensity of their tie being always balanced by a sign ( )
for the adjacent relation indicating a weak and few intensive link.
Lastly, the regime of reproduction of NSSPs depends on the historical and cultural
societal context in which it is embedded. I assume as a ﬁrst approximation that an
elementary way to grasp such a context is to refer to a third binary opposition between
more holistic versus more individualistic societies. More holistic countries privilege the
community and the family, putting in the foreground a logic of needs in the distribution
of income; social protection is here a determining variable of the economic dynamics.
Conversely, more individualistic nations build on the idea of a society being the
contractual or unintended result of individual wants, privileging a logic of individual
value and egotist achievement and performance in the distribution of income; social
protection is there a variable of adjustment in the economic dynamics.
Nonetheless, if in more individualistic contexts economic requisites prevail over those
of domestic reproduction in the determination of the capitalist or market coverage, they
can be ensured by a labor market which is more (as in Germany) or less (as in the United
States) ruled by corporativist arrangements. As for more holistic cases where domestic
requisites take advantage over the pure market logic in the capitalist coverage relation;
domestic requisites can be taken into account either directly by capitalist corporations (as
in the extended “ie” system in Japan (Yoichi and Sautter, 1990), or at a national scale
within the labor-market regime (as in the social-democratic Sweden where life capital is
seen as a social capital and a crucial economic resource for a small national community
which has to face a competitive world market (Mahon, 1994; Pontusson, 1992)).
In the formula of the molecule, this third type of variable can be endogenized by
giving a direction (symbolized by an arrow in Fig. 3) to the market (capitalist) coverage
relation that points to the way the social protection regime dynamically loops. Therefore,
structural analysis using the combination of the three binary oppositions detailed above
allows to deduce eight (23) possible formal regimes of NSSP. It is possible to show that
these different regimes are congruent with many of the outcomes of the comparative
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to “deviant cases” (Autralia, Italy, Low Countries and United Kingdom—as Ferrera
(1994) called them) (Théret, 1997). It is not surprising because the empirical criteria
drawn from evidence and used to classify the welfare-states in that literature are
theoretically reproduced by the various combinations of our three binary oppositions
ruling the elementary structure of NSSPs.
But the deductive logic of structural analysis supplies also a distinction between
“harmonic” and “disharmonic” models (borrowed also from Lévi-Strauss) that leads to
reduce to four the number of stable conﬁgurations of national social protection. Figure 3
displays these deductive four harmonic models whose three look like a structural
stylisation of the three “classical” ideal-types of welfare state already mentionned, and
the fourth can be exempliﬁed by Japan. These harmonic models are deﬁned as molecular
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Fig. 3. From ideal-types of welfare states to harmonic models of NSPS.structures presenting a vertical redundancy of signs in their horizontal oppositions, which
seems a logical condition for their institutional coherence and dynamic viability. In other
words, the viability of harmonic models in the long run is based on the coherence
between their degree of welfare stateness and their degree of decommodiﬁcation. For, as
a high degree of welfare stateness reduces the protective potential of the rest of the
system, its combination with a weak decommodiﬁed social protection will generate
destabilizing forces at the level of the domestic reproduction as well as concerning the
legitimisation of the State, what will push either in the direction of a weaker welfare-
state or a stronger social protection, depending on the relative strength of individualism
and holism in the country. Conversely, a weak but costly welfare state will generate
tendencies either to its bureaucratization or to the reduction of its costs, depending again
on the individualism/holism balance. Therefore the disharmonic molecules (not
represented in Fig. 3 but which can also be used as stylisations of concrete “deviant
cases” as seen above), because they are less stable than the four harmonic models, are
dynamically attracted by them.
In Fig. 3, one sees that the North American US liberal “residual” archetype of welfare-
state matches a meritocratic individualistic-liberal (market centered) model of NSSP
where the civil society, including in that case the market sphere, faces in a pluralist way a
State seen as a pure Léviathan. As for the German “conservative-corporatist” (Esping-
Andersen) or “industrial achievement-performance” (Titmuss, 1974) model of welfare-
state, it matches a meritocratic individualistic-corporatist (civil society centered) model
of NSSP, where the dominant autonomous economic logic of capitalism and individual
achievement moulds a strong public commitment into the distribution of income in a
corporatist way; the Sozialstaat faces the economic order according to a conservative
institutionnalised compromise usually labelled “social market economy”. The same type
of equivalence is worth regarding the “institutional redistributive” Swedish “social-
democratic” ideal-type which ﬁts in with a holistic societal-corporatist (State centered)
NSSP where a national community faces a world market dependent capitalism, in the
limits of a societal “neo-corporatist” compromise between economic and political orders.
The fourth ideal-type that I deduce from the structural analysis, the Japanese type, has
not been qualiﬁed as so in the comparative literature on welfare states (see nonetheless
Therborn, 1987), perhaps because it holds simultaneously liberal and conservative
features, what seems a contradiction in adjecto.4) However, from a structural point of
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4) See our previous remarks on the Esping-Andersen’s qualiﬁcation of Japan as a hybrid, and
Pontusson’s one as a non type, non liberal as well as non social.view, it is a coherent holistic paternalistic-liberal (ﬁrm centered) model characterized by
a weak welfare state (of the liberal residual type) and a strong domestic protection (of the
holistic conservative type) met by capitalist corporations in a paternalistic way
(patronage) which shapes the labor and the economic coverage relation; there, the
economic community—including the domestic order—faces a State primarily
committed to the improvement of the international economic competitivity of the
national economic order.
In summary, the structuralist comparative methodology leads to three outcomes which,
in my view, can be considered as a signiﬁcant value-added : 1/it conﬁrms at a theoretical
level the pertinence of the three ideal-types—liberal, conservative and social-
democratic—of welfare states and extends their signiﬁcance to the whole systems of
social protection, including private and corporate coverages; 2/it introduces on a
theoretical basis in the comparative framework a fourth world of welfare capitalism
symbolised by the case of Japan; 3/it implies that the idea of clustering is
methodologically ﬂawed and empirically improperly reductive, according to the
overwhelming presence of deviant cases and disharmonic models which are better
grasped with the concept of hybridization.
However the way I made use of this methodology till now has several limitations and
has to be enlarged in order to tackle the issues of socio-economic regulation and
institutional change that are the topics of the two following sections. Indeed I considered
that the stability and dynamic viability of a NSSP were only resting on its internal
coherence, and I have integrated societal effects on its dynamics in a quite simplistic
way: these effects have been reduced to the impact of societal values (the hegemonic
discursive regime) on the hierarchy between capitalist market economic and “life
capital” domestic logics that are competing at the core of NSSPs’ dynamics. But societal
effects are much more complex and difﬁcult to tackle on account of the diversity of the
systems of mediation between the economic and the political orders, and correlatively of
the multiplicity of interferences between all these systems. Here is at stake the issue of
institutional complementarity.
Seen as a regulatory alliance between the economic and the political, the NSSP’s
reproduction regime, as for other social mediations (money, law, political interests’
representation, etc.), has to deal with a structural contradiction lying at its core. On the
one hand, it must be ﬂexible to absorb and correct in the short run the undermining
effects on the social cohesion of the political and economic logics left to themselves. On
the other hand, it must be crystallized into institutions to ensure in the long term the
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the boundaries of the sole NSSP, the whole set of systems of mediation which are crucial
components of the mode of regulation being involved according to a general
complementarity and substituability between them. Therefore in order to address the
question of the relation between NSSPs and societal modes of regulation, at least two
theoretical developments are necessary.
The ﬁrst development concerns the relation of NSSPs with money and law. For it is
crystal clear that a social protection regime is depending on the monetary regime since
the former is a regime of (secundary) distribution of the money produced and distributed
primarily by the monetary system. And it is also crystal clear that NSSPs depend on
juridical regimes which deﬁne rights and duties and rule their application (labor law,
social law, corporate regulations, etc.). Monetary and juridical regimes have an inﬂuence
on a NSSP which has to be endogenized as a variable in its dynamics in a similar way as
tried above for the ideological regime. But comparative researches in these domains are
very scarce and partial, surely because of the disciplinary division of knowledge in the
social sciences. Moreover, in ﬁrst approximation, one can assume that there is a
substantive coherence or correlation between the three ideological, monetary and
juridical regimes whose societal effect on NSSPs is, at the level of abstraction where I
stay in this paper, not too badly reported by the binary distinction I made between an
individualist logic of achievement and a holistic logic of needs. For these two reasons, I
shall not go further in that direction here.
Thus, I shall favour an externalist way of addressing the place of the NSSP in the
mode of socio-economic regulation, and focus on the relations between social protection
and political representation, an issue already extensively informed about by the inductive
comparative literature. These relations can be said external because a NSSP is primarily
an economic system built upon money, since a national system of political representation
(NSPR) is a political one built upon Law. The study of the conditions of institutional
complementarity between these two societal mediations directly introduces into the
analysis of the very making of socio-economic regulation.
3. The Diversity of Socio-economic Modes of Regulation in the Light of
Institutional Complementarity between Social Protection and Political
Representation.
In order to build a model of institutional complementarity between NSSPs and NSPRs, I
ﬁrst apply to NSPRs the same kind of analysis and stylisation as for the NSSPs, which
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between the two systems which may be considered as different modes of socio-economic
regulation.
3.1 Elementary stylisation of National Systems of Political Representation
and agregation of economic and political interests (NSPRs)
The analysis of NSPRs raises conceptual problems which are similar to those
encountered in the case of NSSPs. Both appears in our modern differentiated societies as
mediations between the economic and the political, and both are concerned by the
evolution of an autonomous domestic order which cannot be directly controled anymore,
but nevertheless must be ruled so as to allow the two processes of accumulation of
economic wealth (under the form of capital) and political power (under the form of the
state) (Théret, 1994, 2006). This is why I assume a homomorphic transformation from
one concept to the other, and elaborate a model and a typology of the former using the
theoretical categories and methodology already used for the latter.
The transposition of the structural analysis of NSSPs to NSPRs only requires to
reverse, in moving from economy to politics, on the one hand the position of the
consubstantiality and union relationships linking the mediation system to the economic
and political orders (see Fig. 4), and to substitute on the other hand the juridical medium
of communication to the monetary one.
5)
The whole set of institutions of political representation (R)—in concrete terms the
overlapping of a system of political parties and other forms of agregation of private
interests (such as corporatist arrangements), and a system of representative
government—is consubstantial to the political and only in a union relationship (R E)
with the economic order. A NSPR can mediate between private and public interests
because it emerges from the internal differentiation of the political between a civic
political constituency and a bureaucratic administrative constituency (Tocqueville),
differentiation which is correlative of the foreseen crisis of the traditional forms of
sovereignty which has been induced by the emergence of an autonomous (vis-` a-vis the
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5) For more details about this stylisation of political representation, see Théret (1998a).
Fig. 4. Elementary structure of NSPR.State) capitalism. Henceforth institutions of political representation are necessary to
legitimate the administrative logic of control and management of the population (which
is now the ideological anchor of the sovereign power); they are mobilized by the State to
reconstruct its direct ties (P–D) to individuals and economic forces. Reciprocally, these
forces can take advantage of these institutions for their own ends to enter the State.
Hence a political alliance between the political and the economic supported by this
mixed institutions representing and aggregating economic as well as political interests
[P-R E]. Hence too a new politico-juridical relation between the domestic and the
economic and political orders [(R E)-D]. This new relation of civil citizenship is both a
relation of social representation of individuals (subjective rights) and a relation of
socialization and political protection (objective “civil” entitlements transformed via R in
“civic” citizenship’s ones). Moreover as regarding social protection and market coverage
relationships, this civil citizenship relation and the administrative bond (P–D) are in a
dual relation of synchronic substituability and dynamic mutual determination within the
circuit of reproduction of the system. At last, the structural play of binary oppositions
between adjacent relationships can also be used to deﬁne various harmonic and
disharmonic models of NSPR in line with ideal-types found in the comparative literature.
3.2 NSSPs, NSPRs, and conﬁgurations of socio-economic regulation
However, in this article, I am not looking for such a typology per se. I am a priori more
interested in examining the combinations or articulations of the NSSP with the NSPR, in
order to deduce a diversity of models and ideal-types of the modes of regulation which
can stylise the role of social protection within societal regulation. The articulation of the
two elementary structures is outlined in Fig. 5.
To understand this ﬁgure, two others elements of social topology need to be recalled,
the symbolical institutional forms of the Market (M) and the Nomos (N).6) One has seen
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Fig. 5. Elementary structure of societal regulation.
6) For more details on social topology, see Théret, 1992, 1994 or 2006.that a NSSP and a NSPR mobilize respectively two different registers or spheres of the
economic and political orders that are economy (e)—the level of practices of
management of human beings/things relations, and politics (p)—the level of practices of
management of interhuman relations. Therefore the articulation between these two
systems raises the issue of the symbolic transformation of political practices into
economic practices in both economic and political orders and vice versa, condition of
their unity and viability. It is the Market (M) (as a price ﬁxing system) which ensures this
symbolic function in the economic order, transforming reciprocally—thanks to the
mediation of money—political rights and duties of individuals into economic rights and
duties via the recognition and ﬁxation of a monetary value to their havings (labor force
and the various forms of capital). In the political order, the same type of transformation
is ensured by the Nomos  (N), that is to say the system of “central authorities of
nomination” (Bourdieu, 1995) one can label also the “Great book of the public debt”
(Théret, 1994). These institutions of nomination recognize and state juridically the
political value of individuals, their power force from the point of view of the State, and
so doing establish equivalences between social entitlements upon the economic ﬁscal
resources of the State and citizenship rights within the State political sphere.
From the stylisation displayed in Fig. 5 of an elementary form of societal regulation
(which assumes a good functionning of the whole system of relations and corresponding
institutions), one can elaborate on the diversity of modes of societal regulation regarded
here, for the sake of simplicity, as modes of correlation between a NSSP and a NSPR. By
duplicating the structural analysis applied to the NSSP, one obtains from the two binary
oppositions structuring every NSPR—oppositions between (Ep R) and (Pp-R) on the
one hand, [(Ep R)-D] and [(Pp-N)-D] on the other hand—, four models whose
combinations with the foreseen models of NSSP give thirty two possible conﬁgurations
of regulation. But Fig. 6 displays only the eight ones built from the harmonic models of
NSSP, and after elimination of the endogenised binary contextual variable
(individualistic versus holistic) refered to the value system.7)
As soon as socio-economic regulation is laid down in terms of societal coherence
between the NSSP and the NSPR, we can logically deduce harmonic models of modes of
regulation by assuming oppositions of signs in the two pairs of relationships linking the
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7) I assume now that societal effects are better described by the introduction of the different
conﬁgurations of NSPR. In other words, what was assumed to construct endogenous models of NSSP
should now be induced from a confrontation to social facts of more complex conﬁgurational models






















































































.domestic sphere to the economic and the political respectively with regards to two
conditions:
—the political management of D via the NSPR must not be contradictory with its
economic management via the NSSP;
—both must be in simultaneous accordance with the capital accumulation and the
State ﬁscal regimes, and the two relations linking the domestic to the economic order (or
to the political) must not be simultaneously strong for the whole system to be harmonic.
For instance, a sign ( ) in both relations (Ee–D, via M) and (Ep–D, via R) indicates a
too strong link between the economic and the domestic, and a high risk of breakdown of
social cohesion as a result of the correlative too large weakness of the political order. The
same reasonning is worth for two signs ( ) indicating a too large weakness of the
economic.
This conditions sustain the choice of the four already selected harmonic NSSPs as
ideal-types of coherent national modes of regulation also. We can therefore make the
following remarks about these four “models”:
—Individualist meritocratic countries as USA or Germany display a weak (Ep R)
relationship, corresponding to a pluralistic political market and/or a decentralized
political system (federalism) which reduces political inﬂuence of economic organized
interests as such. Hence the economic lobbies’ political role. Holistic countries to the
contrary are acquainted with a strong (Ep R) relationship, that is to say either a strong
presence of labor trade unions in the State as in the case of Sweden and its neo-
corporatist system, or a strong presence of business as for the case of Japan and its
system of merging capitalist groups and State bureaucracy (Chung, 1990).
The strength of the civil citizenship relation [(Ep R)-D] is high in our four countries
when the social domestic protection relationship is strong (Germany and Sweden) and
low in the opposite cases (USA and Japan). But this ﬁgure can be combined with
(Ep R) either weak (pluralistic—decentralized) or strong (neo-corporatist—
centralized) according to the fact there is no necessary transformation of collective
representation of civil interests into public civic representation (Boismenu, 1994).
The [(D-(N-Pp)] relationship is a direct link of the individual to the State, that is either
a bureaucratic administrative bond, as in the liberal logic of “passive” or “statutory
citizenship” (Balibar, 1995) (USA8) and Japan), or a link of more direct civic citizenship
as in countries where “active” or “egalitarian citizenship” (ibid.) is considered as a
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8) Which are no more in the situation of the ﬁrst half of nineteenth century Tocqueville described
them.condition for democracy (Germany and Sweden).
9) This direct relation will be all the
more strong since the relation of civil citizenship is weak. If that strength matches a
weak (Ep R) relationship, it means an insulation of the political system and problems of
legitimacy in a liberal conﬁguration. In that typically US case, the political system holds
a weak reforming power of the society and has to mobilize other resources of
legitimization such as a powerful liberal possessive individualist ideology propped up by
a high social mobility, and a military and monetary hegemony in the world system. If,
conversely, the strength of [(D-(N-Pp)] matches a strong (Ep R) relationship, it means
that institutions of representation of interests tend to exclude domestic and wage-earners
ones (insulation of civil rights in the private sphere) and are mainly monopolized by
business and other dominant groups. It is the case of Japan where “feudal” capitalist
ﬁrms are strongly tied to the State bureaucracy who organizes the political control of the
population in close relation with its economic management within big capitalist
corporations (Yamamuro, 1990).
10)
The weak representation of domestic interests in the political system and the
correlative strong administrative link of the individual or the family to the State in the US
and Japan ﬁt in with a weak welfare-state (Pe S) and a strong market or ﬁrm coverage
of the domestic needs (Ee-D). Nonetheless, the two countries structurally differ
according to the relations between capitalism and the State, and, as one has seen in the
previous section, to the place of the domestic logic of reproduction in the whole system
of regulation. In Japan, in politics as well in the economy, the holistic logic of the
business corporation as a community prevails over the market logic, whereas, in the
United States, the logics of individual achievement and market have an overwhelming
room even in the public political life. On the other hand, in countries with strong
welfare-states like Germany and Sweden, a weaker coverage of the domestic
reproduction by the market and the corporation matches a strong civil representation and
a weaker direct presence of the individual in the State, even if (and may be because) a
democratic conception of that presence prevails over the administrative view. But, here
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9) In the ﬁrst case, we designed in ﬁgure 6 an arrow going from N to D (administrative primacy)
whereas in the second case we draw the arrow from D to N (democratic polity primacy).
10) Following Chung (1990), the absence of trade-union representation in the system of government is
a speciﬁc feature of Japanese neo-corporatism compared to other countries. The State does not
consider it has to intervene directly to control the trade unions, the corporations and employers doing
the job pretty well. The Japanese neo-corporatism is restricted to employers and does not have the
societal dimension of the Swedish one. The question is then: can we still speak of neo-corporatism?
Following Boyer (2002), one has to speak of “meso-corporatism.”again, both countries diverge according to the strength of the neo-corporatist relation
(Ep R), weak in “ordoliberal” Germany (Lehmbruch, 1994) and strong in the social-
democratic Swedish case of societal corporatism.
In summary, the zero degree of the welfare-state which is characteristic of the USA ﬁts
with a highly differentiated society that does not mobilized many and/or sophisticated
social systems of mediation like social security, health system and institutionalized
political representation, the societal coherence being grounded in this country within
direct economic and political relations to the domestic sphere, primary media such as
money and law, and a strong liberal possessive individualism supported by the mass-
medias of communication. Conversely, the institutional constructivism of Sweden is
striking, for the Swedish mode of regulation is fully integrated in an elaborate
architecture of social mediations, a powerful welfare-state at the economic level being
duplicated by a brought to a top neo-corporatist political system. The German and
Japanese cases seem to be two other mutually opposite ideal-types even if they are also
two examples of intermediary models of societal integration. Germany privileges social
integration at the economic and monetary level via a strong welfare-state though it is not
a holistic country; Japan privileges social cohesion via the integration at the political
level of large corporations in charge of domestic protection.
Therefore harmonic societal regulations might be obtained through contradictory
articulations of NSSP and NSPR. Whereas the USA and Sweden look homogeneous
from this point of view in spite of there opposite position vis-` a-vis social
constructivism—their (negative and positive respectively) forms of social mediations at
economic and political levels are redundant—, Germany and Japan show heterogenity of
both forms though in a reverse way: strong economic and weak political mediations in
spite of a powerful corporatism for the former; weak economic and strong political
mediations in spite of a weak labor corporatism for the latter.
But the world is not limited to these “models”. If we take them as references, most of
the countries appears as deviant cases, hybrids and disharmonic models, whose viability
in the long run is permanently threatened by a weak institutional complementarity.
Nevertheless virtue may become vice when change is at stake. Harmonic conﬁgurations
and straight conformity in dynamics to their ideal-typiﬁcation tend to limit the capacity
of model countries to adapt to changes in their external context. They are enclosed in
their virtuous trajectories, and if they are not dominant, if they do not say the law and
impose it, their capacity of adaptation is logically weaker than that of hybrid countries
which are not enclosed in a unique path dependency, and can mobilize an enlarged
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illustrate it with the case of the French hybrid.
4. Hybridization and Institutional Change: The French Lesson
Before coming to the French case, let’s ﬁrst justify its entrance on the stage by coming
back to an important issue in comparative methodology, what can be called the drift from
typology to clustering.
4.1 Hybridization versus clustering
I have mentionned above, in the introduction of this paper, that the notion of cluster is
contradictory with the category of “hybridization” and theoritically does not leave any
room to the idea of deviant cases. As soon as we recognize the existence of institutional
hybrids, the idea of clustering appears as a deadlock. A fortiori, cluster analysis is too
static to make room for differences between members of a same cluster which may be
crucial for their respective dynamics of change. Rather than strictly matching one or the
other ideal-types “hybrid” welfare states and NSSPs combine characters of them.
Dynamic trajectories indeed involve new combinations of these characters. As clustering
dramatically reduces each country’s institutional complexity which underpins the real
changes, it is misleading when changes and institutional innovations are at stake,
moments where “little differences” can matter more than blinding similarities. Two
examples: with a cluster approach how shall we understand that Germany has adopted a
new social insurance for old-age dependency whereas France has chosen an assistance
scheme, although both countries are thought to be members of the same Bismarckian
cluster? And how to explain that belated Latin-rim also classiﬁed as continental
conservative welfare states recently adopted national universal healthcare systems of the
Beveridgean type instead of Bismarkian ones?
Actually clustering is an obstacle to the understanding of changes in NSSPs since it
interprets path dependency as unique, despite the diversity of institutional inheritances
which characterizes the hybrid countries. Assuming that there is only one path of change
inscribed in the very institutional structure of a country by its “family” belonging—the
path followed by the ideal-type—, cluster analysis cannot take hold of the fact that
several paths are opened to countries that have not fully coherent systems of social
protection and political representation. Correlatively institutions inherited from the past
are viewed only as obstacles to change, not as political resources for institutional
innovation. Reasoning on institutional change at the level of clusters of welfare states or
NSSPs inevitably implies that important features of the hybrid cases are underestimated
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Indeed comparative method does not imply resorting to clustering. The limited series
of ideal-types it provides can be used as a comparative framework of reference within
which each case can be located without being reduced to one or another ideal-type. The
above structural analyses, which conﬁrm that the inductive ideal-types of the literature
are stable models, lead to the selection of a limited number of structural variables which
are not discrete but continuous. Henceforth they allow to follow rigorous procedures to
build a framework of reference endowed with quantitative norms of measure of distances
between and from ideal-types, and where every case can be situated, described and
evaluated by its coordinates. I give now a more precise idea of such procedures for the
simple case of NSSPs, before coming to the hybrid character of the French case.
For the construction of a standardized space of measuring, one can ﬁrst deﬁne three
independent axes corresponding to the three binary variables used to differenciate the
NSSPs. Then one can elaborate norms of measure on each axe in accordance with a scale
of value determined by the relative positions on these axes of the four ideal-types. Thus,
one axis will represent the degree of welfare stateness (relative to the intensity of P S
vis-` a-vis E-S), and whose norm of measure can be ﬁxed up by reference to the opposition
between the USA (the more liberal, minimum degree equalized to 0) and Sweden (the
more under state control, maximum degree equalized to 1). The second axis will
represent the degree of decommodiﬁcation of the labor force, with a norm of distance
deﬁned according to the opposition between the USA (the more market and equality of
opportunity oriented, degree 0) and Germany (the more corporatist and status oriented,
degree 1).
11) At last the third axis will concern the degree of residual holism and
importance of the needs’ logic on the labor market and the wage-labor nexus, with a
standard deﬁned in accordance to the opposition between the USA (the most
individualistic, degree 0) and Japan (the most holistic, degree 1). More precisely, as
displayed in Fig. 7, one can assume that a zero degree (0, 0, 0) for a NSSP is the
privilege of the liberal American model, when the degree maximum (1,  1,  1) is
obtained by the Swedish social-democratic model, with coordinates for Germany (the
most decommodiﬁed) and Japan (the most holistic) being respectively ( 1, 1,  0) et
( 0,  0 ,1). Thus, assuming that ratings x, y and z can be built for all the countries and
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11) I assume here that the Swedish labor force is not the most decommodiﬁed as usually considered,
according to its higher participation of women in the labor market. In other words familialist welfare
states have a labor force less commodiﬁed than social-democratic ones according to the higher
proportion of wage earners in the latters.the three variables, every country can be situated at any time in this comparative space (a
cube), thanks to the computation of its coordinates (xi xus)/(xsw xus), (yi yus)/(yge yus)
et (zi zus)/(zja zus).
12)
Since the ideal-types are supposedly harmonic models granted with stability and
viability in the long run, this standardized comparative space is itself relatively stable,
which means that it is possible to design in such a space the historical trajectories of
evolution and institutional change of each NSSP, relatively to ideal-types. This point is
illustrated in Fig. 7 by the case of the French NSSP which appears in the light of our
structural analysis as an institutional hybrid and a deviant case of conservative-
corporatist Bismarckism (see also above Fig. 6 for the speciﬁcity of the French societal
mode of regulation).
4.2 The French case: hybridization and institutional change
In comparative research the French “Welfare State” has traditionally been grouped with
the German one in the “conservative-corporatist” cluster of welfare regimes grouping
countries mainly inﬂuenced by what is usually (though improperly) called the
Bismarckian model of social insurances. In my view, as already suggested above, this
assimilation of France with Germany, despite its usefulness at several levels of analysis,
is globally methodologically and empirically ﬂawed.
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Fig. 7. A standardized tridimensional comparative space for NSSPs.
12) Indexes ge, ja, sw and us are respectively relative to Germany, Japan, Sweden and the USA.France actually has been ignored during a long time by the international comparative
literature on the welfare state. It is not before the second half of the nineties that a series
of informed researches has been produced and been available to compare the French
Social Protection System (FSPS) with other systems.
13) These studies have put in light
some important features which contrast it with the German type. In the area of family
policies for example, the French system rather looks like the “Nordic” social-democratic
Beveridgean regime (Schultheis, 1996; Martin, 1998). The French welfare state has
indeed adequately been described as a Bismarckian system with Beveridgean objectives
(Bonoli and Palier, 1995), the term Beveridgean referring here to three features—
universality, unity and uniformity—common to the liberal and social-democratic
models. This reﬂects the fact that French Etat-providence internalizes a political and
symbolical opposition between corporatism and republican universalism which is crucial
for the understanding of the whole functioning of the French society.
Now, considered at the level of the national system of social protection and not only at
the level of the sole welfare state, the French case is still much more discordant from the
German ideal-type because many other French social institutions are at odds with the
Bismarckian model. For example, “paritarism” is deprived of a functional equivalent for
the German industrial relations system (Tixier, 1998). French trade unions are divided
and very weak; contrary to their German counterparts, they have no substantial say in
ﬁrms’ decisions. French labor law, as part of a “social public order” is rooted in universal
political rights rather than a wage earner status, as in the German model (Mückenberger
and Supiot, 1999). Social rights thus appear more to compensate for a democratic deﬁcit
than to complement labor’s economic rights. Because of the division within the trade
union movement and the powers of state social bureaucracy, paritarism between business
and labor has often been more conventional than substantial (Catrice-Lorey, 1997). In
addition, the French educational system (seldom considered in France as part of the
social protection system) is built on “liberal republican”—akin to Beveridgean,
solidaristic and/or egalitarian principles (Kott, 1996; Bec, 1999). Its limited vocational
training capacity shows a stark contrast with the German system (Maurice et al., 1982;
Verdier, 2000). Consequently whereas Bismarckian features (namely, social insurance,
“weak stateness”, fragmentation) constantly prevailed throughout the welfare state’s
building stages, Beveridgean principles were also at work, and their increasing inﬂuence
within the dominantly Bismarckian welfare state has resulted in growing internal tension.
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13) See for instance Merrien (1997), Palier (1999), Barbier and Théret (2003, 2004, 2009), Théret
2002a.This is particularly clear with family policies, the transformation of family patterns
eroding the legitimacy of social insurance principles to ﬁnance ﬂat rate universal
allowances.
But the FSSP has also faced the external challenges of the internationalization of the
economy and the polity which have destabilized the compromises between actors
matching the hybridized Beveridgean/Bismarckian framework. And as internal and
external challenges emerged, the Beveridgean features of the societal regulation
somehow acted as resources allowing for new potential compromises. Analyzing the
FSSP’s coherence and its embeddedness in French society vindicates the assumption that
“dominated” Beveridgean features tend to provide internal resources for a transformation
towards a new equilibrium of compromises between its two path dependencies of
Bismarckism and Beveridgism. One good example of this is given by the “Contribution
sociale généralisée” (CSG) introduced in 1991, that is an important innovation in
ﬁnancing principles which has gradually and increasingly substituted pay roll
contributions. CSG, being neither a tax nor a social contribution proper, combines
features of both and its taxing base extends to all incomes. Analytically, CSG should be
regarded as a typical hybrid resource combining both social contribution and tax.
Inasmuch as it is generalised to all incomes (wages, beneﬁts and capital earnings), it
undoubtedly bears the characteristics of a proportional tax, given that it is universal and
was initially not deductible from taxable income. However many of its characteristics
make it distinct: it is partially deductible and strictly earmarked to ﬁnance beneﬁts.
Moreover it is not a resource of the state budget and is transferred to the social security
Fund collecting payroll taxes (URSSAF). Hence, despite it is considered as a tax in
French Law, it has been recognized as a social contribution in the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice. The CSG thus emerged as an endogenous institutional
innovation that alters the previous internal balance between Bismarckian and
Beveridgean principles in favour of national instead of “professional” solidarity. Another
recent testimony of this French renewed hybridization is the gradually universalised
access to healthcare and family beneﬁts on the mere basis of residency through the
institution of a supplementary regime called CMU—universal medical coverage—
which is a typical use of a Bismarckian mean to attain a Beveridgean objective .
In summary, compared with Germany, the FSSP’s hybrid structure might well have
constituted an advantage in confronting the challenges of the liberal globalization and
Europeanization. Hybridization between Bismarckian and Beveridgean rationales has
been a key factor of change in the FSSP for the last twenty years, conclusion which is
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internal resources for innovation its Beveridgean features, the FSSP has till now been
able to eschew the polar choice between conservation (continuity) or revolution (radical
change). Here resides the French lesson for the theory of institutional change.
5. Conclusion
Socio-economic regulation requires two simultaneous conditions: 1) national systems of
social protection and political representation which, together with the ideological,
monetary and juridical systems constitute the armature of the mode of regulation, have to
ﬁt in with the accumulation and ﬁscal regimes ensuring respectively the reproduction of
the economic and political orders; 2) NSSPs and NSPRs have to combine coherently or
compensate each other. Various conﬁgurations can meet these conditions and the
structural method helps to discover and analyze them in a logically and systematic way,
since it is a useful tool to evaluating in a deductive way the potential stability and the
differential conditions of viability of the various national modes of regulation.
It is common that scientiﬁc ideal-types are also considered as ethical ideal-types
(Commons, 1934). Harmonic models are often confused with harmonious models, and
recurrently one of them becomes a reference model and is considered as “The model” to
follow, the miraculous formula to adopt. Thus we have had the US model, the German
model, the Japanese model, the Swedish model, and again the US model. But in times of
change and growth of radical uncertainty concerning the future of the economic and
political orders at the world and regional scales, when institutional innovation is at stake,
virtue may become vice and miracles disasters if transplanted in other contexts than
those where they ﬁrst develop. For the more social systems are coherent, the more
change in one part of the system can be dangerous for the whole, according to the
incoherence it brings into it, so threatening the “miraculous” institutional
complementarity reached. The more social systems are path dependent in a unique way,
the more they tend to persevere in their being on the same way, and the less they are able
to adapt to and discover new ways of addressing new challenges. The generality of this
logical rule suffers one important exception: it is not worth for the dominant societies
who are able to impose their model to the others by persuasion, economic coercion, or
political violence. And institutional coherence and stable institutional compromises
inside are power resources for a conquest of the outside.
On the other hand, this exception aside, in period of international change, the majority
of countries which do not beneﬁt of a strong institutional coherence and are not
B. THÉRET
–204–harmonic but hybrid systems, can transform their institutional vices into virtues in order
to maintain their historical and cultural hybrid autonomy without being obliged to reduce
their openness.
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